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A HISTORICAL SKETCH
OF ANGLO-AMERICAN
MEDICAL LAW
(With Emphasis on the Maxim of Respondeat Superior)
by Dennis 0. Norman *
I. Introduction
N MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE, the medical and legal professions are
united to encompass a wide range of human activity. The
spectrum of medical law is so broad that a thorough consideration
of its historical development would require the writing of several
volumes. Consequently, this article confines itself to a discussion
of the primary origins and major developments of Anglo-
American medical jurisprudence. Special emphasis has been
placed upon the agency concept of respondeat superior, since this
doctrine plays a prominent role in medical law and since the doc-
trine has been used of late to significantly expand the potential
liability of the physician.
II. Development of Respondeat Superior in England
The term respondeat superior first appeared in Anglo-
American law during the reign of Edward I (1272-1307 A.D.).1
The doctrine was born in that chapter of the Statute of West-
minster 11 (1285) which regulates distresses by sheriffs or bailiffs,
makes the officer disregarding its provisions answerable, and then
continues, "si hon habeat ballivus unde reddat respondeat supe-
rior suus." 2 Respondeat superior was originally applicable only
to public officials and not to employers generally. Furthermore,
the concept was one of secondary liability which became opera-
tive only when the defendant was unable to satisfy the judgment
* Second year student, University of Akron College of Law.
1 2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law Before the Time of Ed-
ward 1, 533 (2d Ed. 1899).
2 3 Selected Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 380 (1909).
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against him.3 The enactment which gave birth to respondeat su-
perior was merely one of a line of statutes dealing with the op-
pressive public official. Particularly distressing were the dam-
ages inflicted by the under-sheriffs. Since the underlings were
often men of little substance, there was usually little prospect of
enforcing judgments for damages against them.4 Respondeat su-
perior was founded on the principle that "he who expects to de-
rive advantages from an act which is done by another for him
must answer for any injuries which a third person may sustain
from it." 5 Although the doctrine made action against a sheriff
for the torts of the under-sheriff possible, Edward I's statutes
show no "identification" of servant with master and no obvious
feeling favoring "employers' liability." 6 Quoting Sir Frederick
Pollock:
Our common law when it took shape in Edward I's day
did not, unless we are much misled, make masters pay
for acts they had neither commanded nor ratified. Had it
done so, it would have "punished" a man for an offense in
which he had no part.
7
At common law the master was not criminally liable for his
servant's acts except when he commanded or approved them.8
That respondeat superior was not to be used in making masters
pay for acts they neither commanded nor ratified was demon-
strated in Bogo de Clare's Case ((1290), Rot. Parl. i. 24). Pollock
sketches the essentials of the case:
Action against Bogo by a summoner of an ecclesiastical court
who has been ill treated by members of Bogo's mainpast and
compelled to eat certain letters of citation. Action dismissed,
because plaintiff does not allege that Bogo did or commanded
the wrong. Thereupon, because this wrong was done within
the verge of the palace, the king takes the matter up and
Bogo has to produce all his familia; but after all he is dis-
missed as the offenders cannot be found.9
Bogo had recently served a summons against the Earl of Corn-
wall as he was "walking up Westminster Hall to Council" and
3 Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 475 (5th ed. 1956).
4 Ibid.
5 77 C.J.S. Respondeat Superior § 318 (1952).
6 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 1, at 532.
7 Id. at 533-534.
8 Plucknett, op. cit. supra note 3, at 474.
9 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 1 at 534, n. 1.
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had narrowly escaped having to pay a 10,000 pound claim against
him by the insulted Earl. No sooner had Bogo extricated himself
from this predicament, when the summoner of an ecclesiastical
court attempted to serve a summons in Bogo's own house. Hav-
ing recently learned that service of summons was distasteful to
the King, some of Bogo's overzealous lackeys forced the ap-
paritor to "eat his process, parchment, wax and all." 10 Bogo was
thereupon forced to defend himself in an action of trespass in
Parliament. As observed by Plucknett:
His defense is an important text for our purpose, for he took
the line that he was not liable for the wrong that his servants
had done and demurred. The plaintiff was examined and
admitted that Bogo himself neither committed nor ordered
the trespass, and so Bogo had judgment."
Plucknett observes that it was a common practice in some parts
of England during the thirteenth century to exact judgments
against the household for the torts of servants, but that in 1302
it was held "that fining the mainpast was illegal; and in 1313
Staunton, J. declared 'let those who have done wrong come to
answer for their own misdeeds.' " 12 Nevertheless, quasi-
criminal liability of master for servant is found alongside other
rules of frankpledge as late as the time of Edward II (1307-
1326) .13 By the time of Edward III (1326-1377) the applicability
of respondeat superior was extended beyond public officers and
made to embrace abbots whose wards had committed misdeeds.1 4
At its inception, respondeat superior had little bearing on
the medical practitioner. Customarily the medieval physician or
surgeon worked alone and thus was liable only for his own
errors. As the performer of a deed he was responsible for its
consequences whether he acted innocently or inadvertently. 15
Agency concepts, such as respondeat superior, would under-
standably be of little consequence to the physician until medicine
became more sophisticated. The complexity of the modern sur-
gical team with its delegation of responsibility still belonged to
the future.
10 Plucknett, op. cit. supra note 3, at 473.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Holmes, Agency, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 345 (1891).
14 3 Selected Essays, op. cit. supra note 2, at 382.
15 Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 316 (1894).
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III. Early Medical Legislation in England
During the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries
English surgeons and barbers began organizing themselves. The
master-surgeons formed a separate guild in 1368 and recognized
women physicians in 1389.16 In 1421 a statute was passed by
Parliament giving the Lords of the King's Council the power to
prescribe ordinances governing the practices of physicians and
surgeons.17 Interestingly, this medical legislation followed im-
mediately after the combination of the master surgeons and phy-
sicians in 1421. The first statute to regulate the practice of med-
icine in England, proposed in 1422, provided in part:
No one shall use the mysteries of fysyk unless he hath stud-
ied in some university and is at least a bachelor in that sci-
ence (the penalty being 10 £.) and every woman who shall
practice physick shall suffer the same penalty.'
Parliament failed to enact this statute, but the age of English
medical jurisprudence had nevertheless begun.
Up until the mid-fifteenth century, surgery, to a large extent,
was practiced by the Guild of Barbers which, in 1461, became the
Company of Barbers under charter from King Edward IV.19 The
barbers were originally trained for the purpose of bleeding and
shaving monks and, just as physicians looked down upon sur-
geons, the highly educated master-surgeons looked down upon
the barbers. The surgeons obtained a special charter to become
the Guild of Surgeons in 1492.20 Soon the emerging body of
statutory law would fuse these quarrelsome factions.
What became known as the "Bishop's License" was enacted
in the third year of the reign of Henry VIII (1511). This statute
(3 Henry 8 c.3) prohibited the practice of medicine or surgery
by any person until he had been examined and approved for that
purpose by the Bishop of London or, if in the country, by the
bishop of the diocese.21 It was further provided that no one
could practice medicine or surgery in London or within a radius
of seven miles of it without also being "examined, approved, and
16 Garrison, An Introduction to the History of Medicine 172 (1929).
17 Caldwell, Early Legislation Regulating the Practice of Medicine, 18 Ill.
L. Rev. 225, at 229 (1924).
Is Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Garrison, op. cit. supra note 16, at 172.
21 Caldwell, supra note 17, at 229.
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admitted" by four doctors of "physyk" or four expert surgeons.22
A provision of the statute did, however, exempt graduates of Ox-
ford and Cambridge.2 3 The Bishop's License was superseded in
1518 when at the request of certain London physicians, Henry
VIII granted an extraordinary charter which created the College
of Physicians and delegated to it the power of examining and
licensing candidates seeking to practice in London and its sub-
urbs. 24 Furthermore, the charter empowered the College to gov-
ern, by statute and ordinance, all persons practicing medicine in
London; to try and punish those accused of malpractice; to regu-
late the quality and types of medicines used; and to fine anyone
practicing without a license. 25 The new charter was confirmed
by Act of Parliament in 1522 (14 and 15 Henry 8 c.5). Subse-
quent statutes further confirmed it and enlarged the powers dele-
gated to the College.2 6
The legality of the charter and the authority it gave to the
College of Physicians was soon tested in the courts. A certain
Dr. Bonham obtained the degree of Doctor of Physyk from Cam-
bridge and then came to London where he set up practice with-
out obtaining a license from the College of Physicians. As men-
tioned earlier, the Bishop's license had not required graduates of
Oxford or Cambridge to obtain a license. When Bonham openly
defied the College by refusing to obtain a license the College au-
thorities had him imprisoned. Subsequently the Doctor brought
an action against the College for false imprisonment. The College
rested its defense upon its charter. Judgment was given for Dr.
Bonham, but only because the College had failed to properly ex-
ercise its statutory powers, not because Bonham's Cambridge de-
gree enabled him to ignore the licensing requirement. It was
eventually held that all candidates, including graduates of Ox-
ford and Cambridge, must be licensed by the College of Physi-
cians before practicing in London.2 7
By 1540, persons licensed by the College of Physicians were
authorized to practice "physyk," including surgery, anywhere
22 Garrison, op. cit. supra note 16, at 239.
23 Caldwell, supra note 17, at 230.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Id. at 231.
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within the realm (32 Hen. 8 c. 40) .2 With the mushrooming pow-
er of the College of Physicians the barbers and surgeons decided
to unite before being overshadowed entirely. Thus in 1540 the
burgeoning Barber Company united with the small and exclusive
Guild of Surgeons to form the United Barber-Surgeon Company
with the anatomist Thomas Vicary as its first Master.2 9 This
moment was preserved for history in a painting by Hans Holbein
which depicts Henry VIII, "huge, bluff, and disdainful" in the act
of handing the statute creating the United Barber-Surgeon Com-
pany to Thomas Vicary in the company of fourteen other sur-
geons on their knees before the monarch, who does not even con-
descend to look at them.30 Thus the surgeons and barbers now
had the exclusive right to practice surgery within the city of
London and its suburbs. (32 Hen. 8 c. 42)31 This union would
last for some two hundred years until the barbers and surgeons
were again separated into two groups by statute in 1745 (18 Geo.
2). At that time the privilege of practicing surgery would be
transferred to the new Company of the Art and Science of Sur-
geons of London, which would also be authorized to regulate the
examining and licensing of those proposing to practice surgery.
32
Notwithstanding all the charters and licensing requirements,
charlatans were still a major problem in the mid-sixteenth cen-
tury. Quoting Fielding H. Garrison:
Quackery was rampant everywhere, and in the vigorous
language of the English surgeon William Clowes was prac-
ticed by "tinkers, toothdrawers, peddlers, ostlers, carters,
porters, horse-gelders, and horse leeches, idiots, applesquires,
broom men, bawds, witches, conjurers, soothsayers and sow
gelders, rogues, set-catchers, runagates, and proctors of spit-
tle houses." 33
Charles Green Cumston also commented on this problem:
In the reign of Edward 6, Grigg, a poulterer in Surrey, was
put in the pillory at Croydon and again in Southwark, for
cheating people out of their money by pretending to cure
them by charms, or by looking at them, or by casting their
water. Many other quacks (were) at various times ... sub-
28 Ibid.
29 Garrison, op. cit. supra note 16, at 239.
30 Ibid.
31 Caldwell, supra note 17, at 231.
32 Garrison, op. cit. supra note 16, at 307.
33 Id. at 237.
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jected to punishment. Anthony was punished for his Annum
Potabile; Dee, for advertising medicine to cure all diseases;
Foster, for selling a powder for the cure of chlorosis. Tenant,
a urine caster who sold pills at six pounds apiece; Aires, for
selling purging sugar plums; Hunt, for putting up bills for
the cure of diseased in the streets. The council in the reign
of James I, dispatched a warrant to the Magistrate of Lon-
don, to arrest all reputed empirics, and cause them to be
examined by the Censors of the Royal College of Physicians.
Several were arrested and acknowledged their ignorance. 34
To combat quackery the Company of Barber-Surgeons obtained
an extended charter in 1629 which granted it the right to exam-
ine and approve all persons practicing or wishing to practice sur-
gery in London and Westminster and empowering those so ap-
proved to practice anywhere in England. 35
IV. Early Medical Legislation in America
In the seventeenth century the American Colonies made
their debut in the field of medical jurisprudence. Apparently
the earliest Colonial attempt to regulate the practice of medicine
was a Virginia statute in 1639 concerning physicians' fees.36 Ten
years later Massachusetts enacted a law forbidding "phisitians,
chirurgians, midwives or others," presuming "to exercise or putt
forth any act contrary to the knowne rules of arte" or exercising
"any force, violence or cruelty . . . no, not in the most difficult
and desperate cases,-without the advice and consent of such as
are skilfull in the same arte." 37 This same law was appro-
priated by the Duke of York for the province of New York in
1665.38
To the City of New York falls the distinction of having en-
acted the first well-considered act regulating the practice of med-
icine in the Colonies. Passed on June 10, 1760, it applied only to
the City of New York and, in part provided that no person would
be allowed to practice (under penalty of 5 pounds and costs)
medicine or surgery until he passed an approved examination. 39
34 Cumston, Laws Governing Civil Malpractice in the Middle Ages, 15
Green Bag 413-14 (1903).
35 Caldwell, supra note 17, at 232.
36 Id. at 233.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Id. at 234.
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In 1773 New Jersey passed an act similar to that of New York
City and became the first Colony to have a comprehensive med-
ical law.40 The Code of Virginia (1773) required every surgeon,
physician and dentist to obtain a license before practicing in that
colony. Failure to do so entailed a fine of $30 to $100 and de-
prived the practitioner of any right to collect fees owed him for
his services prior to licensing. 41 A perceptive comment on Colo-
nial medicine is Garrison's observation that:
Under the primitive, frontier conditions, the medieval an-
tagonisms between the physician and surgeon soon disap-
peared for the necessary and sufficient reason that, while
midwifery was in the hands of women, the open country or
backwoods doctor was liable to be called upon in any emer-
gency, and, thrown upon his own resources, soon learned to
enlarge such native skill as he had in bone-setting, treatment
of arrow and bloodshot wounds, reducing hernias and the
like.42
By the eighteenth century the traditional animosity between
physician and surgeon had begun to subside in England. Co-
incidentally there appeared the first serious English works on
medical jurisprudence. William Hunter's Essay on the Signs of
Murder in Bastard Children (1783) was a milestone in the field of
medical jurisprudence and was soon followed by the Samuel
Farr's Elements (1788), which has been called the first substan-
tial English work on legal medicine.43 These two works mark the
beginning of the modern period of Anglo-American medical law.
Because of limitations on length, only one aspect of modern med-
ical jurisprudence can be considered in this paper: the liability
of physicians and surgeons for the acts of their subordinates.
V. Recent History of Respondeat Superior
Although the maxim of respondeat superior originated in the
time of Edward I from cases involving the torts of inferior public
officers, as late as 1685 the courts were still clinging to the me-
dieval rule of no liability on the part of a master for the uncom-
manded and unratified acts of his servant. 44 In Kingston v.
40 Ibid.
41 Id. at 235.
42 Garrison, op. cit. supra note 16, at 307.
43 Id. at 371.
44 Plucknett, op. cit. supra note 3, at 475.
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Booth, 1 Skinner 228, 90 Eng. Rep. 105 (1685), the judges gave the
opinion ". . . if I commanded my servant to do what is lawful,
and he misbehaved himself or do more, I shall not answer for my
servant, but my servant for himself, for that it was his own act.
)) 45 Shortly thereafter the doctrine of the master's liability in
mercantile law was broadened by Lord Holt, who, in the case of
Boson v. Sandford, 2 Salk 440, 91 Eng. Rep. 382 (1691), laid down
the general rule: ". . . whoever employs another is answerable
for him, and undertakes for his care to all that make use of
him." 46 Plucknett feels that this rule could hardly have been
possible without the prior existence of the concept of respondeat
superior .
4 7
Holt, C. J. also originated the modern law of vicarious liabil-
ity through the fiction of the implied command. He explained
and supported this fiction by use of the maxim Qui facit per
alium facit per se, which was of "ancient currency" in England,
"though originally, in its application to tort, it meant no more
than that a man who specifically commanded a tort was liable
for it." 48 In speaking of the new doctrine of implied command
Holt said: "No master is chargeable with the acts of his servant,
but when he acts in execution of the authority given him by his
master . . . the act of the servant is the act of the master." 49 As
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. observed: "It is plain good sense to
hold people for wrong which they have intentionally brought to
pass . . ." 50 but Holt's approval of vicarious liability has puzzled
at least one modern writer.51 In any event, subsequent decisions
upheld and extended Holt's concept. In Ackworth v. Kempe, 1
Doug. 40, 99 Eng. Rep. 204 (1788), Lord Mansfield held . . . "for
all civil purposes the act of the sheriff's bailiff is the act of the
sheriff." 52 And in the 1826 case of Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. and
C. 547, 108 Eng. Rep. 204 (1826), Littledale, J. held: "... Servants
represent the master himself, and their acts stand upon the same
45 8 Holdsworth, A History of English Law 473 (2 ed. 1937).
46 Plucknett, op. cit. supra note 3, at 475.
47 Ibid.
48 Williams, Vicarious Liability: Tort of the Master or of the Servant?
72 Law Q. Rev. 523 (1956).
49 Ibid.
50 Holmes, supra note 13, at 347.
51 Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 Yale L. J.
584 (1928).
52 Williams, supra note 48, at 523.
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footing as his own." -1 Blackstone, in his Commentaries, also
gave the opinion that a "wrong done by the servant is looked
upon in law as the wrong of the master himself." 54
The doctrine of respondeat superior applies only where the
relationship of master-servant, employer-employee, or principal-
agent exists between the wrongdoer and the person charged for
the resulting wrong. 55 The person or party being charged must
stand in the relation of a superior to the wrongdoer and must be
shown to have had the right to direct and supervise the wrong-
doer.56 Where such a master-servant relationship can be found to
exist, the liability of a doctor for the negligent acts of his assist-
ants may be predicated on the theory of respondeat superior.57 To
hold the physician liable it is necessary to show that his assistant
was negligent, since the basis for liability is the misconduct of
the assistant which is imputed to the physician.58 As long as the
agent acts within the scope of the master's authority, or in his
employment, the master is liable to an injured third party for the
torts of his agent "even though the tortious act was not com-
manded or expressly authorized." 59 Laski summarized the in-
herent difficulty of this harsh reasoning when he commented:
"... while everyone can see that the master ought to answer for
acts he has authorized, why should he be liable either where no
authorization can be shown or where express prohibition of an
act exists?" 60
In truth the responsibility of public servants was traditional-
ly greater than the responsibility of private servants and, as
Oliver Wendell Holmes observed:
(It) might be asked whether respondeat superior in its strict
sense is not an independent principle which is rather to be
deemed one of the causes of modern law, than a branch from
a common stem. It certainly has furnished us with one of
the inadequate reasons which have been put forward for the
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 77 C.J.S. Respondeat Superior p. 319 (1952).
56 Ibid.
57 Williams, supra note 48, at 523.
58 Note, 32 N. C. L. Rev. 140 (1953).
59 77 C.J.S. Respondeat Superior p. 318 (1952).
GO Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 Yale L. J. 105, at 107 (1916).
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law as it is,-that somebody must be held who is able to pay
the damages.61
Physicians and surgeons are in a public calling, and that
they are historically liable for their own acts has already been
noted. But the growth and sophistication of medical science in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries created new problems for
the courts. Take, for example, the development of the modern
surgical team with its intricate and often critical divisions of
responsibility. To an increasing extent a surgeon's assistants are
no longer his employees. Instead they are the employees of the
hospital in which the operation is performed and are only tem-
porarily assigned to assist him. Suddenly the seeming simplicity
of respondeat superior becomes a "veritable hornet's nest of
stinging difficulties." 62 To what extent is the surgeon liable for
the acts of his temporary assistants? Does his liability for their
acts with his patient ever cease and if so when? What is the
hospital's liability for the acts of its employees while assisting the
surgeon? To what extent is the hospital liable for the surgeon's
negligence? Quoting Glanville Williams on this last question:
Perhaps the greatest difficulty with the fiction involved in
the master's tort theory is to decide how far the master is to
be notionally put into the position of the servant at the time
of the act of negligence .... This must obviously be so in
cases where a hospital authority is held vicariously liable for
the negligence of a surgeon. It would be absurd to attribute
the surgeon's act to the hospital authority, and then to ask
whether such act would be negligent if performed by the
authority. The answer could only be in the affirmative, for
it would be negligent for the authority, not possessing sur-
gical skill, to perform the operation at all. The only way to
apply the master's tort doctrine to such a case is to decide
whether the act is negligent in the surgeon before notionally
transferring it to the hospital authority.
63
As most hospitals in the late nineteenth century were char-
itable organizations, questions arose as to the extent which char-
ities should be held for the negligence of their servants. One
view was expressed in the 1876 case of McDonald v. Massachu-
setts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876), where the court
held:
61 Holmes, supra note 13, at 357.
62 Laski, supra note 60, at 106.
63 Williams, supra note 48, at 541.
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(The) duty of a charitable hospital corporation is confined
to the exercise of reasonable care in furnishing suitable ac-
commodations and competent attendants ... beyond the per-
formance of these duties there is no liability of the corpora-
tion for the negligence of its servants.
Three years later a Rhode Island court held that "once the
relation of servant and master is made out, a charitable corpora-
tion is liable for its servants' negligent acts ... ." Glavin v. R. I.
Hospital, 12 R. I. 411 (1879). In 1894 a Michigan court held: "A
charitable corporation can never be held liable for the negligence
of its servants." Downs v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60
NW 42 1894). In short, the American courts at the close of the
nineteenth century were not in agreement as to whether the doc-
trine of respondeat superior extended to hospitals. 64 Interesting-
ly, the contemporary English courts refused to distinguish be-
tween charitable and business corporations in applying respon-
deat superior.65
The modern trend has clearly been toward increased hospital
liability. In Smith v. Duke University, 219 N. C. 628, 14 SE 2d
643 (1941), it was determined that a hospital may be liable for
negligence in recommending or selecting a physician. Subsequent
cases reaffirmed this holding, so that now a hospital admitting
a patient for treatment and also acting as an agent to recommend
or employ the attending physician is liable in the event of negli-
gence or malpractice. 66 Since nurses are manifestly in the service
of the hospitals, it has also been argued that hospitals must re-
spond for the acts of nurses in their employ unless it can be
proven that the nurse acted under the control of a third person
or in a "professional," as opposed to an "administrative," ca-
pacity.6
7
Although it has been held that the physician-patient relation-
ship does not necessarily rest on contract (Thaggard v. Vafes, 119
SO 647 (Ala. 1928)), the "liability of a physician to a patient for
malpractice is dependent upon the existence of a physician-
patient relationship or upon a relationship based on contract." 68
64 Comment, 9 Harv. L. Rev. 543.
65 Ibid.
66 Note, 29 N. C. L. Rev. 206 (1950-51).
67 Laskin, Case and Comment, 16 Can. B. Rev. 568 (1938).
68 Note, supra note 66, at 206.
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Certainly the signing of a permission slip before an operation is
a consensual gesture which dates back to the written guarantees
of release in medieval times. With few exceptions an operation
performed without the consent of the patient automatically con-
stitutes an assault for which damages are recoverable.69 In the
absence of a special contract to the contrary, the physician-
patient relationship begins upon acceptance of the patient for
treatment and terminates upon mutual agreement, the patient's
dismissal of the physician, or determination by the physician that
his services are no longer needed. 70 It is fairly well established
that where no specific contract exists to the contrary, the physi-
cian does not guarantee to effect a cure and is not obliged to stay
with a case until his services are no longer needed; Davis v. Pitt-
man, 212 N.C. 680, 194 S.E. 97 (1937). However, a physician is
bound to use reasonable care in terminating his treatment, and
terminating his services without giving the patient ample oppor-
tunity to secure other medical attendance is tantamount to aban-
donment; for this the physician becomes liable for damages. 71 In
other words, a physician or surgeon who takes a patient for treat-
ment can be discharged by the patient without notice, but he can-
not discharge the patient without notice.72
With the remarkable growth of medical and surgical special-
ization in the last forty years has come the problem of "shifting
responsibility" in cases involving respondeat superior; Funk v.
Bonham, 204 Ind., 170, 183 N. C. 312 (1932). Can a physician or
surgeon relieve himself of liability for the negligent acts of a sub-
stitute physician or surgeon? If so, under what circumstances?
In the light of such questions the following safeguards have been
suggested:
(To relieve himself of liability, for the negligence of a sub-
stitute, a physician or surgeon should make certain that: )
(1) he is under no contract which would create a greater
liability than that which rises out of the mere physician and
patient relationship, (2) due care is exercised in selecting
such substitute (and) (3) by the relations actually existing
among the parties under their agreements or acts, agency
between the physicians in fact does not exist. 73
69 Cline, Professional Liability, 35 Neb. L. Rev. 549 (1956).
70 Note, supra note 66, at 207.
71 Cline, supra note 69, at 548.
72 Ibid.
73 Supra note 66, at 210.
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Whether or not fees were received by the assigning physician is
of no consequence in cases of shifting responsibility. A physician
cannot escape liability by refusing to charge for his services.
74
Liability of a physician for the acts of his assistants usually
exists in one of two situations: (1) where the physician himself
was negligent in allowing the assistant to injure the patient or
(2) where the assistant's negligence is imputed to the physician
under the principles of agency.75 As to the first situation, it has
long been held that a doctor's liability is dependent, in part, on
his presence at the time of the negligent act. Perionowski v.
Freeman, 4 Fost. & F. 977, 176 Eng. Rep. 873 (1886). The courts
usually consider a physician or surgeon to be in "control" when
he is in charge of treatment and is present in the room with the
patient and assistant during the administration of treatment.
76
Obviously a doctor's "control" of a treatment is governed in part
by his authority to give directions. Emerson v. Chapman, 138
Okla. 270, 280 P. 820E (1929).
A physician may be held personally liable for "employing,
retaining, or using an incompetent assistant" as, for example,
engaging a layman to administer anesthetic. 77 It is the doctor's
legal duty to see that treatments administered to his patient are
carried out correctly. However, the physician may delegate sim-
ple tasks to properly trained assistants and thereby relieve him-
self of legal responsibility.78 A notable exception lies in the mat-
ter of counting gauzes or sponges used in a surgical operation.
Here many courts hold to a rule of strict liability and will not
allow the physician to escape responsibility by assigning this task
to an assistant.79 Finally, the physician is also liable for negli-
gently instructing or supervising his assistant, and some courts
have absolved the assistant of liability when, in performance of
his legal duty, he has administered the treatment under the spe-
cific, but erroneous, instructions of the physician in charge.8 0
In the second situation of physician responsibility agency
principles play a more prominent role. In the landmark case of
74 McClean, Doctor versus Law, 13 Green Bag, 352 (1901).
75 Note, supra note 58, at 138.
76 Id. p. 140.
77 Id. p. 138.
78 Ibid.
79 Id. p. 139.
80 Ibid.
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Ybara v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d 687 (1945), it was
held that the doctor in charge of the operation is liable for the
negligence of those who become his temporary servants for the
purpose of assisting in the operation. The older rule was that
a physician or surgeon might be liable for the malpractice of his
partner but not for the negligence of interns, nurses, or hospital
employees unless he owns or controls the hospital.81 In the case
of Harlan v. Bryant, 87 F. 2d 170 (Ill. 1936), a nurse placed a
30% silver nitrate solution (normal strength 1%) in a new-born
infant's eyes and seriously damaged the child's vision. An action
was brought against the surgeon who attended the child at birth
in an effort to hold him responsible for the nurse's negligence on
the basis of respondeat superior. In defense it was shown that
the nurse was not in the employ of the surgeon and that the sur-
geon was not present when she administered the solution. Fur-
thermore it was demonstrated that use of a silver nitrate solution
was unnecessary. After losing below, the surgeon appealed and
judgment was reversed and remanded. In finding for the surgeon
the court held that where no duty exists to perform the service
out of which the injury arises and where the party performing it
is not the surgeon's servant, the surgeon is not liable for the
party's negligence.
Perhaps the most spectacular medical malpractice case in-
volving respondeat superior in recent times is that of McConnel
v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A. 2d 243 (1949). Here the defendant-
obstetrician was employed by the plaintiff to attend his wife dur-
ing pregnancy. At the time of delivery it was determined that
a Caesarean operation would be necessary. To aid in this oper-
ation the defendant directed an intern to assist him by taking
care of the baby after delivery. The plaintiff alleged the intern
negligently administered silver nitrate to the infant's eyes after
birth. Evidence was introduced to show that silver nitrate is
a caustic solution requiring careful dosage and that the "usual
technique required is to apply one or two drops in each eye with
immediate irrigation." 82 Testimony revealed that the intern ap-
plied an excess of the solution and failed to irrigate immediately.
The result of the intern's negligence was the loss of the child's
right eye, which ultimately had to be excised and replaced by
81 Cline, supra note 69, at 548.
82 Waters, A Caveat to Surgeons, 14 Ins. L. J. 796 (1949).
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a prosthesis, and permanent damage to her left eye as the result
of scarring. Suit was instituted by the child's father in his own
right and on her behalf against the obstetrician alone without
naming as defendants either the intern directly responsible for
the negligent act or the hospital in which the operation was per-
formed. The plaintiff did not charge that the obstetrician was
personally guilty of negligence but, under the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior, sought to hold him for the negligence of the
intern. The trial court directed a verdict for the doctor from
which the plaintiff appealed.
The principal question before the Appellate Court was
whether, in the light of the intern's negligence, the doctrine of
respondeat superior applied to the obstetrician. Was the intern,
in the view of the law, the servant, agent, or employee of the ob-
stetrician for the course of the operation which necessarily in-
cluded attention to the newborn infant? The essential test in
determining whether a person is a servant, agent, or employee
of another is whether or not he is subject to the control or right
of control of the other who is deemed his superior during per-
formance of the duties in question.13 Under cross examination
the obstetrician admitted that all persons in the operating room
were under his control or were subject to his control in the per-
formance of their duties.
A second question in the case was whether the intern, as an
employee of the hospital, could actually become the obstetrician's
servant, agent, or employee at the same time. Determination of
defendant's responsibility was found to be a question for the jury,
but the court held (p. 248):
In determining whether the intern was the defendant's
servant at that time, the mere fact that he was then in the
general employ of the hospital would not prevent the jury
from finding that he was also at the same time the servant
of the defendant if he was then subject to the defendant's
orders in respect to the treatment of the child's eyes with the
silver nitrate solution.
Ultimately the final judgment for the plaintiff in the McCon-
nel case was based upon the surgeon's right to control the acts
of his subordinates during an operation. To argue that a physi-
cian is in "control" it is necessary to establish his presence in
83 Ibid.
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the room during the operation or treatment.8 4 Once the physi-
cian leaves his patient, as in the post operative situation, the
courts generally will cease to hold him liable under respondeat
superior for the negligence of others attending the patient.85 The
major contribution of the McConnel case to contemporary med-
ical law is its ultimate conclusion that, in cases of wanton negli-
gence, the physician in control should be required to explain the
cause of injury. Furthermore, he must prove that he exercised
reasonable skill and care in supervising the activities of his sub-
ordinates, for failure to do so will raise the presumption of his
own negligence.8 6 Respondeat superior today is viewed as a just
but harsh rule capable of considerable abuse.8 7 The current trend
in the law indicates that our courts are quickly approaching a
position where physicians and surgeons will be responsible not
only for their own acts but also for the acts of those who assist
them.88
84 Davis, supra note 58, at 140.
85 Ibid.
86 Waters, supra note 82, at 797.
87 77 C.J.S., Respondeat Superior § 318 (1952).
88 Waters, supra note 82, at 798.
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